A Black Day For The German Army

After Germany's defeat in World War One, that country's nationalists adamantly maintained that the German Army had not been defeated in the field, and the Empire's devastating loss had been caused by a "stab in the back" from treacherous factions in the homeland, led by communists, socialists, and Jews.  The primary military proponent of the stab in the back was former Army General Erich Ludendorff, considered the brains behind General Hindenburg, the army chief of staff, Germany's most powerful military leader.  It also became a constant theme of the new leader of the National Socialist Party, Adolph Hitler.  The real story was much different.

In March 1918, after transferring hundreds of thousands of troops from the Eastern Front where Russia had withdrawn from the war, Germany launched the first of four massive Western Front offensive designed to defeat Britain and France before fresh American soldiers began flooding into France.  Those assaults resulted in advances, but ultimately failed and, in the process, caused enormous casualties among German troops, and exhausting and damaging the morale of the survivors (for more background read The Kaiserschlacht).

Sensing that the tide had turned, late July saw the Allies agree on launching a series of coordinated offensives designed to decisively evict German armies from France.  The first of these offenses occurred around the city of Amiens beginning on August 8, 1918.  The innovative attack plan, which involved masses of new available tanks and doing away with the normal lengthy pre-attack bombardment met with immediate success, as British, Canadian, and Australian forces gained seven miles in the first day, a shockingly large advance after the stagnant fronts of the prior four years.  It was the beginning of what became known as the Hundred Days Offensive which finally ending the four years of bloodletting.

More alarming to the German command than the ground lost were reports of their troops retreating without making strong resistance, and the taunting of reinforcements as they moved to the front.  Ludendorff referred to it as "the black day for the German army".  It shattered Ludendorff's confidence and from that time he was convinced that Germany could not win the war.

At an Imperial Conference on August 14, Ludendorff for the first time took up the position that victory by arms was impossible, and therefore peace by understanding was necessary.  The military situation worsened over the next six weeks, finally prompting a panicked note from Ludendorff to the military liaison to the government asking to transmit to the Imperial Chancellor his "urgent request that our peace proposals should be issued at once. To-day the troops are holding their own: what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen."   This was followed later in the day by a further communication from Ludendorff containing "his urgent request to issue the peace proposal at once, and not to hold it back until the formation of the new Government, which might be delayed."

The civilian government however hesitated to take Ludendorff's advice until, on October 3, General Hindenburg reiterated Ludendorff’s message, stating that “The German army still stands firm and is defending itself against all attacks. The situation, however, is growing more critical daily, and may force the High Command to momentous decisions. In these circumstances it is imperative to stop the fighting in order to spare the German people and their allies unnecessary sacrifices. Every day of delay costs thousands of brave soldiers their lives.”

It was only then that Germany's civilian government stated publicly its willingness to engage in peace negotiations based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points.  It was the military, not civilians, which prompted the actions leading to Germany's agreement to an armistice on November 11, 1918.