On April 4 I wrote about the latest iteration of the Iran War in Further on Mastering The Tides Of The World.
I refer to it as the latest iteration because Iran declared war on the
United States in 1979 and that declaration remains in effect.
We are at war once again, this time with Iran. Before it started I did
not know what the right course of action was. Now that it has commenced
I think it essential we achieve victory along the lines outlined by
Secretary of State Rubio. This is a circumstance where, having started
the task, failure to achieve these outcomes will have serious long-term
negative consequences for the United States. I am aware of the sunk
cost fallacy but, in this case, we need to continue. I'm also painfully
aware of the potential for unforeseen consequences, a theme that has prompted a number of THC posts.
We now have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Iran. In 2015 I wrote several posts
on the Iran Nuclear Deal, which, as a reminder, was a "political
commitment", not a treaty, Executive Agreement, signed document, or
legally binding, so thought I'd take a look at the MOU, which is also
just a political commitment (though in this case signed by the parties).
Beyond
that, I am not sure how to characterize the document. Partly because
it reads more like a 60-day ceasefire agreement pending a final deal and
partly because Donald Trump is one of the parties. Point 3 of the 14
Point agreement reads:
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to
negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days, extendable
with mutual consent.
In April, after mentioning
my uncertainty about whether to initiate another phase of the Iran
conflict, I stated the need to achieve victory along the line mentioned
by Marco Rubio, including elimination of the nuclear and ballistic
missile threats. I did not reference President Trump because I could
not find a coherent set of demands by the President, other than
blustering and often contradictory outbursts. Nor did the President
ever set forth for the American people a clear explanation of why now
and what his goals were, a necessity if you are entering a prolonged
conflict.
Moreover, we know from the past decade that Trump has a
short attention span, is often fuzzy in his language, improvises as he
goes along, is subject to bouts of pettiness, and corrupt, making it
impossible to predict where he will end up on any issue or, indeed, if
there is any final ending.
Trump has now said many things about
Iran and given different and conflicting messages. He did the same
regarding tariffs, where his justifications changed on almost a daily
basis. It's why I always wait a while to comment on anything involving Trump. Reacting to anything he says on Monday is useless because he often completely changes his tune on Tuesday and then switches again on Wednesday.
He also seems to regard every negotiation as a form of
commercial real estate deal. When it comes to foreign policy that can
sometimes works (see Venezuela and, perhaps, Cuba(1)) where
ideology does not play a significant role. But it does with the Iranian
regime which has consistently, since it came to power in 1979, acted in
accordance with its ideology, even at great cost to the welfare of its
people. Trump seems to think the enticement of dollars and business
will lead it to change its ideology. I believe he is mistaken, just as
FDR was when it came to the Soviet Union (see Personal Handling).
For all of those reasons, I had reservations, because with Trump you never know where you stand.
Let's start by looking at the situation pre and post this latest round:
1.
The Straits of Hormuz were open to transit for all vessels. However,
Point 5 of the MOU concedes de facto veto power to Iran:
Upon the signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make
arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial
vessels with no charge for 60 days, only from the Persian Gulf to the
Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will
immediately start, and considering the need for removing the tactical
and military obstacles and de-mining by the Islamic Republic of Iran
will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will
conduct dialog with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future
administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz, in
discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the
applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states
of the Strait of Hormuz.
2. The Iran regime was subject to severe sanctions. Under the MOU those will be lifted.
The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of
sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United
Nations Security Council resolutions, i.e. International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors resolutions and all unilateral U.S.
sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed upon schedule.
3.
The Iran regime was under severe financial pressure as its
infrastructure and financial stability crumbled. Under the MOU, the
U.S. has pledged up to $300 billion in "other people's money" for
Iranian reconstruction. Given the U.S. was focused on military, not
civilian targets including energy infrastruture, what are these
reconstruction funds to be used for? As I pointed out in the 2015 deal,
money is fungible and can be used for anything, including continuing to
fund Iran's terror proxies like Hezbollah and Hamas.
The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to
develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion
(£225 billion) for the reconstruction and economic development of the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
4. Iran's ballistic
missile capabilities were unrestricted and proved to be considerable in
this latest round. They remain unrestricted.
5. Iran had pledged
not to develop nuclear weapons. It reiterates that pledge in the MOU,
adding that it will not "procure" such weapons. No one believed this in
2015 and no one believes this now.
Under the MOU, the pre-attack
status quo has not been preserved. Iran is better off now than it was.
I would not characterize that as a U.S. victory.
In their public
statements, President Trump and VP Vance are stressing the "moderation"
of Iran's new leaders. We've been down this road before as Presidents
Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and Obama (2) all fell for the moderation line,
while Bush II passively refused to retaliate when Iranian IED's killed
hundreds of U.S. soldiers during the Iraq War. I think they will be
disappointed.
I think Trump lost interest in the whole subject
when Iran did not collapse in the first couple of weeks and has moved on
to other things that have caught his attention like his self-generated
quarrel with Italy's Meloni over whether she asked for a photo with
him. A puzzled and furious Meloni, who has generally been supportive of
Trump over the years, responded:
"Donald
Trump's statements are completely fabricated. I am frankly stunned. I
don't know why the president of the United States behaves
like this toward his own allies. After all, it is not the first time."
"I can only say it's a shame he doesn't show the same resolve
toward with the enemies of the West and toward the enemies of the United
States — toward leaders with whom he, on the other hand, is much more
accommodating. But there is one thing he should remember: Italy and I do
not beg."
While the MOU is only a cease fire
I don't think Trump will have the appetite to resume force in the event
of a failure to reach a final deal. Unless he gets ticked off by
something or someone. Who knows? He certainly doesn't.
As a
practical matter there are big difficulties ahead. Gulf State sources,
with the exception of Qatar, friends of the Iranians, Hamas, and the
Trump family(3), are not happy with the MOU provision looking for
them to fund Iran's rebuilding. On the other hand, the U.S. proved
such a feckless ally they may be forced to get closer to Iran for
protection.
Point 14 states:
The final deal will be endorsed by a binding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution.
However,
France's Foreign Minister yesterday said it would not approve lifting
current UN sanctions unless the final agreement addressed Iran's use of
terrorist proxies and its ballistic missile program, neither of which
are covered in the MOU.(4)
Finally, Point 1 addresses Lebanon, a country that neither the U.S. nor Iran are directly involved in:
The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their
allies in the current war, by signing this MOU, declare the immediate
and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts,
including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war
or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the
threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. The final deal will confirm the
permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon and
other provisions of this paragraph.
This is
intended to address Hezbollah's recurrent attacks on Israel and the
Israeli response. However, the omission of Israel, as in language that
should read "including in Lebanon and Israel" is striking, since it is
Hezbollah's attacks that triggered the Israeli response. The provision
also effectively leaves the initiative with Iran, which controls
Hezbollah. Indeed, Hezbollah has continued to attack Israeli forces,
killing four IDF soldiers and when Israel responded, Iran announced it
was closing once again the Straits of Hormuz. The Iranians want to see
how Trump responds. Depending on the President's mood at any particular
moment he may lash out at the Israelis or the Iranians. Who knows?
And that is the problem.
-----------------------------------------
(1)
Cuba remains nominally communist, but it's as ideologically dead as the
Soviet Union in its final years. The country is now being run by a
criminal gang.
(2) President Obama may not have thought
the Iran regime was moderating. He just didn't care. His foreign
policy aide Ben Rhodes thought, and still thinks, the mullahs, along
with Hezbollah and Hamas, are the good guys.
(3) The
problem of Qatar, along with Russia and China, is bigger than just the
Trump family. The degree of influence the three enemies of America have
attained with academic institutions, media, think tanks, politicians,
influencers, and podcasters is staggering.
(4) Of course,
France and our other European allies refused to help the U.S. keep the
Hormuz Straits open, compounding our problems.
Ten years ago I wrote four posts about the Iran Nuclear Deal. Thought I'd relink to them given current events.
The Iran Deal: It Was Never About Nuclear Weapons in which I analyze the negotiations, the actual contents of the JCPOA (yes, I read the whole thing), and the underlying agenda of the Obama administration. It also includes the conclusions of a number of prominent Democrats.
He's At It Again about the rhetoric employed by the president in support of the agreement.
What Is The Iran Deal? Turns out it was not a treaty, nor an executive agreement, a signed document, or legally binding. It was, in John Kerry's words, simply a political commitment.
For an assessment of the current situation, today's Tablet Magazine carries an interview with a former IAEA inspector regarding Iran's nuclear facilities, Can Israel End Iran's Nuclear Program? Having reached this point, the only way out is to do so by whatever means necessary (though I want Israel to do this without direct American involvement).
I'll also link to a piece I wrote in January 2020, Reflections On The Middle East Wars, which includes some additional comments on Iran. Since writing it, I've done additional research which would lead me to add material to the Iraq section, though I knew the basics at the time and should have made the point more clearly. If I were doing that post today I would emphasize in addition to the intelligence failures, the absolute disaster of the Bush administration when it came to post-war planning and defining goals. I was not impressed with George W Bush during the 2000 campaign but felt reassured on the foreign policy side with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Powell leading the team. I viewed them as sober, experienced politicians. What a mistake! Cheney went nuts, Rumsfeld was irresponsible, and Powell employed passive-aggressive behavior throughout. They were never in agreement about the decision to attack Iraq or what to do afterwards while National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice failed miserably in what should have been her role in reconciling those views and coming to some time of agreement. And the ultimate responsibility was President Bush's in going to war with no clear sense of goals or plan for the aftermath, other than fantasies about Iraq's future. The failures of the foreign policy establishments of both parties after the ending of the Cold War is a cautionary tale and one of the reasons Trump ended up as president.
The position of those opposing the deal was that because it was not a treaty, it was not binding and a future President could revoke the agreement. Back in September, liberal law professors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove took Senator Marco Rubioto task in The Atlantic for making this claim, stating flatly, "Rubio is wrong". Their view was that this is a Congressional approved Executive Agreement and thus the Senator's position was nothing more than:
an unprecedented pledge to inaugurate his term by repudiating the
constitutional command to “take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.” There has already been too much lawlessness from the
presidency since September 11th; Rubio’s celebratory anticipation of
further illegalities represents a new low.
What irresponsible ignorance from the Senator! We are shocked!
Of course, one thing to keep in mind about any statements from law professors about the state of the law is that they are very prone to describing the current state of the law according to what they think it ought to be rather than what it is. Since the legal academy leans left most such assertions lean in that direction (see for instance, the embarrassing performance of law professors when predicting outcome of the commerce clause arguments around the Affordable Care Act).
Thankfully, the matter has now been clarified and the Obama Administration has made it clear it agrees with Senator Rubio and not with the distinguished professors. In response toa letter from Representative Mike Pompeo (R-KS) regarding the status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or "the deal" in which he noted that none of the parties to the JCPOA had actually signed it, the State Department responded on November 19 stating that the JCPOA is:
Not a treaty
Not an Executive Agreement
Not a signed document
Not legally binding
According to the State Department the JCPOA is merely a "political commitment".
We are not making this up, read it for yourself.
The Iran nuclear deal (about which THC wrote at length) has dropped out of the news, but its impact will be felt, for better or worse, in coming years.
In the last month we've learned that while negotiations were going on, Iran and Russia were meeting with Bashir Assad's regime to plan the offensive which they deliberately delayed until the U.S. Congress failed to block implementation of the deal.
THC also came across an very interesting position paper on the deal which he'd like to bring to your attention. Written by freshman California Congressman Ted Lieu it is the most detailed review THC has seen of the technical aspects of the deal (as opposed to the geopolitical issues surrounding it). Lieu is a very liberal Democrat, who has voted to remove all US forces from Iraq and opposed the Administration's proposed air strikes against Syria, but voted against the Iran nuclear deal.
Rather than, in his words, rely upon either optimistic or pessimistic assessments of Iran's future behavior, Rep Lieu states his approach is to "look at what the JCPOA allows Iran to do and then I assume it does it".
In the course of his 23 page, heavily footnoted, review Rep Lieu concludes:
Iran will likely be far stronger than it is today in terms of both its military and economy, at a very short breakout time, not just for one nuclear weapon, but many nuclear weapons and capable of delivering nuclear weapons long range, potentially onto our homeland.
By lifting the arms embargo in year five and the ballistic missile ban in year eight, the deal allows Iran to significantly build up its military, export more terror, and acquire or develop advanced ballistic missile technology. The JCPOA also allows Iran, when the nuclear rollback provisions expire, to have a vast nuclear infrastructure. Iran can legally spin an unlimited number of advanced centrifuges and stockpile an unlimited amount of enriched uranium. The situation caused by the JCPOA likely increases the chances of war and conflict, both in the short term and long term, and could fuel an arms race in a volatile region of the world.
After considerable thought and study, I have concluded the JCPOA increases the chances of more regional conflict and US entanglement in the Middle East in the short term and a lengthy, difficult and more deadly war with Iran in the long term.
Rep. Lieu notes that these consequences:
. . . occur if Iran complies with the JCPOA . . . If Iran were to cheat, then the potential existential threat to America would occur sooner.
It is worth reading the entire document which provides a detailed analysis of the deal along with an evaluation of alternatives and can be found here.
(If you are selling your house, these are the buyers you want to negotiate with)
In which we are driven to seek advice from Homer Simpson . . .
The agreement between Iran, the United States and five other nations is going to go into effect as, from the American perspective, an Executive Agreement and not as a Treaty. It is therefore not a binding legal obligation on the U.S. and can be revoked by any President at any subsequent time, for any reason. As Secretary of State John Kerry pointed out, the agreement is not being submitted as a treaty for ratification since it would not be approved by Congress, an accurate assessment, as current counts are it would be rejected by overwhelming majorities in both houses and the latest polling data of the American public shows overwhelming disapproval.
When the Obama Administration undertook negotiations THC thought it would be difficult to achieve a useful agreement but, unlike some others, felt it worth a try (though he also assumed it would be submitted as a treaty if an agreement was reached). Indeed, if the Administration had achieved all or most of the elements it initially publicly deemed essential to a good deal it would have been worth taking the risk. But at end of day, the Administration gave up on all of its critical positions so here's what we are faced with in the agreement:
1. The Iranian regime does not have to give an accounting of its nuclear weapons development program, a key demand of the U.S. and it allies, and essential to constructing a baseline of the current status of its program.
2. Iran is subject to a very loose inspection program, from which U.S. inspectors are barred, involves a degree of self-inspection by the Iranian regime and is, in part, based on protocols between the UN International Atomic Energy Administration and Iran to which the U.S. does not have access.
3. There will be no inspection of some of the most important Iranian installation, including Parchin which was deemed essential by the Administration in its earlier statements.
4. There is no "anytime, anyplace" inspection regime as the Administration promised it would insist upon.
5. Most of the Iran's nuclear development infrastructure remains in place so if it decides to "break out" from the agreement it can proceed very quickly.
6. The approximately $150 billion in frozen Iranian assets will be returned to the regime to do as it wants.
7. Sanctions will be lifted so that Iran can sell its oil and entice companies from around the world to set up operations there, benefits worth billions annually. And, as a practical matter, there will be no "snap-back" sanctions for violations of the agreement despite the Administration's claim.
The problem isn't that the Administration moved on a few of what it claimed were the essential elements of the deal; it's that it moved on all of them.
The bottom line is that we've left Iran with the initiative to determine whether or when to abide by the nuclear components of the deal and in the meantime opened the financial spigots for them. Iran has not agreed to curtail any of its support for terrorist and revolutionary groups around the world. The Supreme Leader has recently reaffirmed that "Death To America" remains the policy of his regime and we left four American still in Iranian custody (including Saeed Abedini, an Idaho pastor convicted of starting local home churches and Jason Rezain, a reporter for the Washington Post) who can be used at some future date by the Ayatollahs to extract more concessions from the U.S. In contrast the Administration thought it important enough to get back Bowe Bergdahl, an Army deserter whom several U.S. soldiers died trying to rescue and who is now facing a charge of "misbehavior of before the enemy" which carries a potential life sentence and for whom we surrendered four Taliban terrorists.
THC thinks this is a bad deal. If we failed to reach agreement, Iran would still have had the initiative to determine whether to proceed with the bomb but at least they would not have had the money.
It is telling that the best argument supporters of the deal outside the White House can come up with is the equivalent of:
"Well, since the Administration screwed up the negotiations so badly that the entire sanctions regime is going to collapse anyway, we might as well go ahead with the deal since there's no Plan B anymore."
Think THC is exaggerating? In supporting the deal a couple of days ago, Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) stated "This is not the agreement I would have accepted at the negotiating table" and that he wanted to "begin the process of addressing the deal's shortfalls, unwanted impacts and consequences" (leave aside that his statement is logical nonsense, the deal is the deal once it is in place; think about what he's saying about it). And read Senator Cory Booker's (D-NJ) statement supporting the agreement which can be found near the end of this post, in fact make sure you read the statements of all four Democratic politicians (two supporting and two opposing the deal) which THC discusses later on. (The Ayatollah of Rock n Rolla (obligatory Road Warrior reference))
Iran does not need the bomb in the short-term now that it has what it wants; huge amounts of cash to fund its foreign objectives, a clear message sent to the Sunni states that it, not the U.S, is the big dog in the region, the leisure to determine whether and when it suits their needs to break out of the constraints of the deal (and even if they don't break out of the deal, Iran now has the right to have nuclear weapons when the deal expires in 15 years) and retaining the American hostages to get further goodies.
Think THC is kidding? Here is Iranian President Rouhani's assessment:
Our objective was to have the nuclear program and have sanctions
lifted. At first they wanted us to have 100 centrifuges now we will have
6,000. They wanted restrictions of 25 years now its 8. First they said
we could only have IR1 centrifuges, now we can have IR6, 7, and 8,
advanced centrifuges. Heavy water plant at Arak had to be dismantled but
now it will remain with heavy water under conditions. Fordo had to be
closed now we will have 1000 centrifuges there.
On the other hand, the good news is John Kerry is in the running for the Nobel Peace Prize he so desperately wants.
So what do we do? When in doubt we should always consult with Homer:
But why did the U.S. give on all of its key positions? Was it just bad negotiating? Well, it certainly was bad negotiating but it didn't matter because the point from the Administration's perspective was to get an agreement, not its substance. To understand why let's look at recent history and the viewpoint of this Administration.
THC will do this from the perspective of American interests, not those of Israel which have been the subject of some commentary in connection with the deal, though he will admit he finds it perplexing and appalling that the President has gone out of his way be deferential to a regime and supportive of its legitimacy even while millions of Iranians protested the 2009 election results; a regime whose oft-reiterated policy is Death To America and who have acted upon it killing 258 Americans in the bombings of the Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in Beirut, torturing to death our CIA station chief in Lebanon, killing 19 Americans in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar barracks in Saudi Arabia and supplying the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that killed hundreds of American soldiers in Iraq and whose leaders continue to insult and denigrate not only America but President Obama himself, while at the same time the President personally authorized someone on his staff to tell journalist Jeffrey Goldberg for publication that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was "chickenshit" for being reluctant to bomb Iran. (From Khamenei's twitter feed (yes, he is active on twitter), showing Barack Obamawith a gun to his head; according to the President this is not "chickenshit")
The history of U.S.-Iranian relations is important because that is was this deal is really about, not nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration believes that this deal is the key to its desired rapprochement with the Iranian regime, a approach that they think will, over time, lead to a moderation in the regime's actions and a new balance of power in the Middle East which will allow America to lower its profile in that region. The deal only make sense in this context and, in fact, if President Obama is correct in his assessment the deal is a good one. Your own conclusion as to the accuracy of that assessment is the key factor in whether you should support or oppose the deal as Senator Schumer points out in his statement referenced below.
Several American Presidents have attempted reconciliation or at least some improvement in relations with the Iranian regime almost from the moment the Shah was overthrown in 1979. The hostage crisis in 1979 was triggered by President Carter's attempt to reach out to the new regime by telling them the U.S. would proceed ahead with the arms sales it negotiated with the Shah, that it would recognize the new regime and allow it access to Iranian assets in the U.S. The radicals in the regime, led by the ayatollahs, encouraged the storming of the U.S, embassy in order to derail attempts at reconciliation.
The Iran-Contra scandal had its origins in the Reagan Administration's attempt to free the captive CIA station chief in Lebanon, held by Iran's tool Hezbollah and because the President had been told their were moderates in the regime who would respond favorably if the U.S. transferred missiles to them via Israel for use against Saddam in Iraq. We all know how that went.
Attempting to open dialogue in late 1990s the Clinton Administration tried apologizing for U.S. actions in the Iran during the 1950s. The Iranian regime mocked the President and Secretary of State Albright and rejected the overture.
Interestingly it was during the early phases of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and President Bush's labeling Iran as part of the "Axis Of Evil" that the regime was intimidated enough to temporarily cease work on its illegal nuclear weapons program. It was also in this period that a frightened Muammar Ghaddafi gave up his nuclear program, which unlike the current Iran deal, actually did involve dismantling and removing the nuclear material from Libya. And then it all went wrong as Bush got bogged down in Iraq after failing to find the WMD.
Starting in 2006 the Bush Administration, acting through the U.S. Congress and the United Nations, began using sanctions to bring pressure on the Iran to halt its nuclear weapons development program. To its credit, the Obama Administration strengthened those sanctions increasing pressure on the regime. In addition, as we know now, the President began secretly communicating with Iran's Supreme Leader in 2009 and making gestures of good will in an attempt to restore relationships between the two countries. It is in this context that the Administration emphasis on the legitimacy of the reign of the Iranian theocracy in the face of the demonstrations in 2009 can be explained.
It is also based on the President's deep seated belief that the burden is on the United States to take the first step in repairing relations and that once we take steps to heal and correct our mistakes Iran will reciprocate, a view the President seems to hold broadly about American interaction with the rest of the world. The current discussions sparked a connection THC had missed before that reinforces my thesis.
THC has written previously of Mark Bowden's book, Guests Of The Ayatollah, about the 1979-80 hostage crisis. In it, he recounts a discussion between Nilufar Ebtekar, a young women who attended American schools while her father was obtaining a Doctorate at the University of Pennsylvania. Ebtekar, one of the most despised of the hostage takers, was lecturing hostage Tom Schaefer on the evils of the America's racist decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when Schaefer responded:
"The Japanese started the war, and we ended it," Schaefer said. "What do you mean, the Japanese started the war?" Ebtekar asked. "The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, so we bombed Hiroshima." "Pearl Harbor? Where's Pearl Harbor?" "Hawaii" After a moment of silence Ebtekar asked "The Japanese bombed Hawaii?" "Yep" said Schaefer. "They started it, and we ended it."
This reminded him that in Barack Obama's first autobiography, Dreams From My Father, there is an interesting passage in which he writes of the transformative experience of listening to Reverend Jeremiah Wright, through whom he found Jesus and who became his spiritual advisor. Obama tells us of Wright's words:
"'a world . . . where white folks' greed runs a world in need' . . . and so it went, a meditation on a fallen world . . . Reverend Wright spoke of Sharpsville and Hiroshima, the callousness of policy makers in the White House and in the State House."
It is shared world view we find here - both believe America is in the wrong (for more on the President's reflexive use of this rhetoric read this post). And things have now come full circle. Ms Ebtekar changed her name, founded an Iranian Women's NGO Network, became the first female Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was named by the United Nations Environmental Program as a "Champion of the Earth" and most recently THC saw her on the BBC criticizing American foreign policy - which does indicate a difference in world views right now - President Obama thinks he has now placed America on the "right side of history" while Ebtekar still think we are still in the wrong; in fact, the Iranian regime seems to be sending a consistent message despite the President's efforts: "we're really not that much into you".
And it is only in this context of the President's belief that this agreement will lead to favorable changes in Iran's behavior that his actions make sense. The reason this deal is acceptable to the President is because its primary purpose was never about Iran dismantling its nuclear program (though, if as part of the process the Iranians did so THC is sure the President would have been fine with that as it would have made his job easier). In order for there to be a U.S. - Iranian rapprochement and thus for Obama's hoped for chance of improvements in relations that would lead to cooperation and allow the U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East, Iran had to be managed into at least nominal compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Without that, the President would not have the maneuvering room to improve relations. That's why a managed trajectory that eventually allows Iran to become a nuclear power if it choose that route was just as good as dismantling a program because it provided enough of a fig leaf for the U.S. and Europe to say "it's a deal!".
The nuclear deal will make substantial funds available to the Iranian regime. One of the themes of the President has been that because Iran's economy and infrastructure is in such bad shape that the influx of billions of dollars will have to be spent on internal improvements, not on increasing havoc in the Middle East or on armaments programs. THC believes this statement indicates the President's weakness in math. The ending of sanctions will make about $150 billion available to Iran apart from the billions more that will begin flowing in as it sells oil and strikes business deals.
It is estimated that Iran's total financial support to the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza is about $7 billion a year. Iran could double its financial support for these groups for the next five years and it would still have more than 75% of its financial windfall available for internal improvement and that does not even include the additional ongoing revenues from the end of sanctions related to oil.
UPDATE: THC just came across this letter of September 2 from Secretary Kerry to members of Congress. While the contents are not new to THC, it provides a useful insight into what looks like the overall incoherence of Administration policy. The Administration has been acting on two different paths regarding the nuclear deal. The first is to insist it is just about nuclear weapons and the Administration is under no illusion about Iran changing its behavior The second is from numerous articles in which unnamed government officials talk about how the nuclear agreement is really part of a sophisticated approach to "tame" Iran and find areas where our interests and theirs converge (and certainly the President's secret diplomacy with the Supreme Leader and other related statements backs this second path). Secretary Kerry's letter follows the first path stating:
We share the concern expressed by many in Congress regarding Iran's continued support for terrorist and proxy groups throughout the region . . . We have no illusion that this behavior will change following implementation of the JPCOA . . .
The Secretary then goes on to state actions the Administration has taken and is prepared to take to support Israel and the Arab states, including increasing financial support and further arms sales. In other words, having agreed to lift sanctions on Iran which will allow that regime to undoubtedly increase its own arms and those of the terrorist and proxy groups they support, the United States will, in turn, fund Iran's local opponents. In summary, we are funding both sides of an arms race.
In closing, Secretary Kerry cannot resist invoking the toothless spectre of the United Nations and the international community by referring to the continuing UN resolutions "prohibiting arms transfers to Iranian-backed Hizbollah in Lebanon, Houthis in Lebanon, and Shia militants in Iraq . . . " That delusional passage brings further into question the Secretary's judgement as it is evident to any casual observer that the existing UN resolutions have, in no way, constrained Iran's ability to arm its allies. In the most notorious example, despite UN resolutions barring rearming and the presence of UN "peacekeepers", Hizbollah not only completely rebuilt its military structure after the 2006 war it provoked with Israel, it is now better-armed than ever thanks to tens of thousands of short-range missiles provided by Iran.
THC reiterates; a deal along the lines the Administration originally sought would have been worth the risk. The deal they actually agreed to is not. It becomes more and more clear who the real JV team is.
This is a sampling of the specific issues on which the Administration caved:
“the deal we’ll accept is — they end their nuclear program; it’s very straightforward.” President Obama in2012 campaign:
Nope. They continue R&D under the agreement and nothing is dismantled.
We will not agree to uranium enrichment by Iran.
"There is no right to enrich. We do not recognize a right to enrich."
John Kerry, November 24, 2013
The U.S. started by conceding to Iran the right to have its own nuclear reactors but not to develop the capacity to enrich nuclear fuel.
The U.S. ten conceded to Iran the right to enrich but under strict limitation.
Finally, the U.S. conceded to Iran that the strict limitations on enrichment would expire at a set point in the future. (Arak heavy water plant)
The underground research facility at Fordow will be closed.
"We know that they don't need an underground fortified facility like Fordow to have a peaceful nuclear program" President Obama December 7, 2013
“We
know that they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility
like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program,” - See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-what-us-officials-said-iran-what-we-know-now-0#sthash.ylMWaFwr.dpuf
Nope. Limited inspections with advance notice, some self-inspections by the Iranians and certain sites completely off limits. You may have heard concerns that in backing away from "anytime, anywhere" inspections the U.S. has agreed to inspections with 24 days notice. It's actually much worse than that. Here's what really is going to happen according to pages 42-43 of the Agreement:
Step 1: Requests for access "will be made in good faith with due observance of the sovereign rights of Iran, and kept to the minimum necessary".
Step 2: "The IAEA will provide Iran the basis for such concerns and request clarification"
Step 3: There is no time limit set forth for Iran's response to the IAEA.
Step 4: "If Iran's explanations do not resolve the IAEA's concerns, the Agency may request access to such locations"
Step 5: "Iran may propose to the IAEA alternative means of resolving the IAEA's concerns."
Step 6: If the matter is not otherwise resolved with 14 days of the IAEA's request for access under Step 4, the IAEA and Iran must reach agreement on access.
Step 7: If the IAEA and Iran fail to reach agreement within the 14 days, within the following 7 days, the Joint Commission, by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members would advise on the "necessary means" to resolve the IAEA's concerns. Commission members are China, Germany, France, U.K. Russia, U.S., Iran and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
Step 8: Iran must implement the "necessary means" within 3 days.
So just how long do you think it will take to go from Step 2 to Step 4? And one other point; assuming that in any dispute Iran, China and Russia will be difficult to deal with it means that the European countries will be the "deciders" - take what comfort you can in that. Senator Schumer doesn't take much; as he noted "It is reasonable to fear that, once the Europeans become entangled in
lucrative economic relations with Iran, they may well be inclined not to
rock the boat by voting to allow inspections."
“We
know that they don’t need to have an underground, fortified facility
like Fordow in order to have a peaceful nuclear program,” - See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-analysis-what-us-officials-said-iran-what-we-know-now-0#sthash.ylMWaFwr.dpuf
Conventional arms embargoes, including those on ballistic missiles, will stay in place.
US lead negotiator Wendy Sherman (former social worker and chief negotiator of the landmark nuclear and ballistic missile deals with North Korea during the Clinton Administration which successfully restrained . . . oh, wait a minute) to Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2014:
The joint plan of action does address the fact that their ballistic
missiles that could be used as a delivery mechanism for nuclear weapons
must be addressed as part of a comprehensive solution because it is part
of the U.N. Security Council resolutions. So it is true that in these
first six months we have not shut down all of their production of any
ballistic missile that could have anything to do with delivery of a
nuclear weapon, but that is, indeed, going to be part of something that
has to be addressed as part of a comprehensive agreement.
As late as April 2015 the White House was distributing a fact sheet claiming the restrictions would remain in place.
The reality in the final deal:
The conventional-arms embargo will stay in place for five years, and the
ballistic-missile embargo will be in place for eight years but will be
lifted sooner if the IAEA definitively clears Iran of any current work
on nuclear weapons. The IAEA is very unlikely to find evidence of
current nuclear-weapons work, as it won’t be allowed to inspect non-declared nuclear sites where this activity is taking place. This means these embargoes could be lifted much sooner.
(This one's for you!)
"Snap-back" sanctions are readily available for quick implementation if Iran violates the agreement.
But as Rob Satloff at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy points out:
There is only one penalty for any infraction, big or small — taking
Iran to the UN Security Council for the “snapback” of international
sanctions. That is like saying that for any crime — whether a
misdemeanor or a felony — the punishment is the death penalty. In the
real world, that means there will be no punishments for anything less
than a capital crime. . . . But the problem with snapback gets worse.
The agreement includes a statement that Iran considers a re imposition of
sanctions as freeing it from all commitments and restrictions under the
deal. In other words, the violation would have to be really big for the
Security Council to blow up the agreement and reimpose sanctions. That
effectively gives Iran a free pass on all manner of small to mid-level
violations.
The problem is actually worse. Once companies have made substantial investments on the ground in Iran they will become effectively lobbyists for the Iranian government in order to protect their investments. Every country that is a party to the agreement will have a powerful internal lobby against doing anything to upset the apple-cart.
In addition, it appears that under the Corker process, the U.S. sanctions will expire meaning Congress will need to pass entirely new sanctions in the future, normally a lengthy process and one that will likely place it in conflict with its allies. That's how the real world, not John Kerry's fantasy land, works.
THC could go on and on in the same vein but it's too depressing. If you'd like to read more a useful summary of the key defects in the agreement can be found in the Senate testimony of Dr Robert Joseph, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security and the man who negotiated the dismantling of the Libyan nuclear program in 2003 and for one of many lists documenting the Administration's progressive folding on what it insisted was essential aspects to the deal read this piece.
Now let's take a look at some of the statements from those supporting and opposing the agreement. We'll be partisan and only look at Democrats.
Let's start with Leon Panetta (full statement here), former Secretary of Defense under President Obama. Read this excerpt and guess his position.
In itself, the Iran deal would appear to reward Tehran for defying
the world, make funds available for its extremist activities and
generally make it stronger militarily and economically. Although the
agreement provides for a temporary delay in Iran's nuclear enrichment
capability, it allows Tehran to retain its nuclear infrastructure and
obtain sanctions relief. The risk is that Iran could become an even
bigger threat to the region.
Let's
face it, given the situation in the Middle East, empowering Iran in any
way seems like a dangerous gamble. Islamic State is on the march; the
Arab Spring is in shreds; Syria and Yemen are failed states; Iran is
supporting Syria's Bashar Assad, Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen; the
Saudis are fighting in Yemen; Egypt is fighting in the Sinai Peninsula;
Hamas and Hezbollah are rearming to confront Israel; the Palestinians
are languishing; Libya is fighting itself; Turkey is fighting ISIS and
the Kurds.
The response of the United States to these threats is
driven more by the crisis of the moment than by any overarching
geopolitical or military strategy. The principal driving motivation
appears to be to avoid being trapped by another war in the region.
He's endorsing the agreement! This is what THC means about the arguments of the agreement's supporters. Panetta then goes on to outline what he thinks essential to making the deal work:
Enforce the deal. A certain inertia follows the approval of any arms
deal. That cannot happen in this case. The United States must work
diligently with its allies, the United Nations and the International
Atomic Energy Agency to fully implement the constraints in the
agreement. Any violation, even a small one, must be swiftly and strongly
addressed.
Maintain a strong military presence. Force projection by our naval, air and ground forces is vital for defending our interests.
Expand
intelligence capability. If Iran violates the agreement, it will do so
covertly. For that reason, the United States must restore its
cooperative intelligence relationship with Israel and invest in
intelligence operations with our other allies. Monitoring Iranian
activity, targeting terrorist leaders and networks, and assessing
potential threats and hidden activities will be crucial for both
stability and security in the region
Make
it clear that force is an option. Although the use of force should
never be the first response, the argument against military action has
been made so often that it has created uncertainty about our will to do
what we say. For that reason, Congress should pass a resolution
authorizing the current and future presidents to use force to prevent
Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon. This is U.S. policy; there
should be no doubt that force can be used if necessary to stop Tehran
from building a bomb.
Does anyone who has watched the White House for the past seven years think any of this likely?
This is from New York Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer opposing the deal (here is the entire piece):
After fifteen years of relief from sanctions, Iran would be stronger
financially and better able to advance a robust nuclear program. Even
more importantly, the agreement would allow Iran, after ten to fifteen
years, to be a nuclear threshold state with the blessing of the world
community. Iran would have a green light to be as close, if not closer
to possessing a nuclear weapon than it is today. And the ability to
thwart Iran if it is intent on becoming a nuclear power would have less
moral and economic force.
In addition, we must consider the non-nuclear elements of the agreement.
This aspect of the deal gives me the most pause. For years, Iran has
used military force and terrorism to expand its influence in the Middle
East, actively supporting military or terrorist actions in Israel,
Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza. That is why the U.S. has labeled
Iran as one of only three nations in the world who are “state sponsors
of terrorism.” Under this agreement, Iran would receive at least $50
billion dollars in the near future and would undoubtedly use some of
that money to redouble its efforts to create even more trouble in the
Middle East, and, perhaps, beyond.
Finally, the hardliners can use
the freed-up funds to build an ICBM on their own as soon as sanctions
are lifted (and then augment their ICBM capabilities in 8 years after
the ban on importing ballistic weaponry is lifted), threatening the
United States. Restrictions should have been put in place limiting how
Iran could use its new resources.
When
it comes to the non-nuclear aspects of the deal, I think there is a
strong case that we are better off without an agreement than with one.
Using
the proponents’ overall standard — which is not whether the agreement
is ideal, but whether we are better with or without it — it seems to me,
when it comes to the nuclear aspects of the agreement within ten years,
we might be slightly better off with it. However, when it comes to the
nuclear aspects after ten years and the non-nuclear aspects, we would be
better off without it.
Therefore, I will vote to disapprove the agreement, not because I
believe war is a viable or desirable option, nor to challenge the path
of diplomacy. It is because I believe Iran will not change, and under
this agreement it will be able to achieve its dual goals of eliminating
sanctions while ultimately retaining its nuclear and non-nuclear power.
Better to keep U.S. sanctions in place, strengthen them, enforce
secondary sanctions on other nations, and pursue the hard-trodden path
of diplomacy once more, difficult as it may be.
Probably the best, and most comprehensive, statement of opposition is from Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) which is worth reading in full. Some excerpts:
“Unlike President Obama's characterization of those who have raised
serious questions about the agreement, or who have opposed it, I did not
vote for the war in Iraq, I opposed it, unlike the Vice President and
the Secretary of State, who both supported it. [A reference to President Obama's recent cheap shot] My vote against the Iraq
war was unpopular at the time, but it was one of the best decisions I
have ever made.
“We know that despite the fact that Iran
claims their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, they have
violated the international will, as expressed by various U.N. Security
Council Resolutions, and by deceit, deception and delay advanced their
program to the point of being a threshold nuclear state. It is because
of these facts, and the fact that the world believes that Iran was
weaponizing its nuclear program at the Parchin Military Base -- as well
as developing a covert uranium enrichment facility in Fordow, built deep
inside of a mountain, raising serious doubts about the peaceful nature
of their civilian program, and their sponsorship of state terrorism --
that the world united against Iran's nuclear program.
“In that context, let’s remind ourselves
of the stated purpose of our negotiations with Iran: Simply put, it was
to dismantle all -- or significant parts -- of Iran's illicit nuclear
infrastructure to ensure that it would not have nuclear weapons
capability at any time. Not shrink its infrastructure. Not limit it.
But fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear weapons capability.
“We said we would accommodate Iran's
practical national needs, but not leave the region -- and the world --
facing the threat of a nuclear armed Iran at a time of its choosing. In
essence, we thought the agreement would be roll-back-for-roll-back: you
roll-back your infrastructure and we'll roll-back our sanctions.
“At the end of the day, what we appear to
have is a roll-back of sanctions and Iran only limiting its capability,
but not dismantling it or rolling it back. What do we get? We get an
alarm bell should they decide to violate their commitments, and a system
for inspections to verify their compliance. That, in my view, is a far
cry from ‘dismantling.’
“While I have many specific concerns
about this agreement, my overarching concern is that it requires no
dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and only mothballs that
infrastructure for 10 years. Not even one centrifuge will be destroyed
under this agreement. Fordow will be repurposed, and Arak redesigned.
(Fordow Facility)
“The fact is -- everyone needs to
understand what this agreement does and does not do so that they can
determine whether providing Iran permanent relief in exchange for
short-term promises is a fair trade.
We lift sanctions, but -- even during the first 10 years of the
agreement -- Iran will be allowed to continue R&D activity on a
range of centrifuges – allowing them to improve their effectiveness over
the course of the agreement.
“It will, in the long run, make it much harder to demonstrate that
Iran's program is not in fact being used for peaceful purposes because
Iran will have legitimate reasons to have advanced centrifuges and a
robust enrichment program. We will then have to demonstrate that its
intention is dual-use and not justified by its industrial nuclear power
program.
Within about a year of Iran meeting its
initial obligations, Iran will receive sanctions relief to the tune of
$100-150 billion in the release of frozen assets, as well as renewed oil
sales of another million barrels a day, as well as relief from sectoral
sanctions in the petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding, port sectors,
gold and other precious metals, and software and automotive sectors.
“Iran will also benefit from the removal
of designated entities including major banks, shipping companies, oil
and gas firms from the U.S. Treasury list of sanctioned entities.
“As the largest State Sponsor of Terrorism, Iran – who has exported its
revolution to Assad in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in
Lebanon, and directed and supported attacks against American troops in
Iraq -- will be flush with money, not only to invest in their domestic
economy, but to further pursue their destabilizing, hegemonic goals in
the region. If Iran can afford to destabilize the region with an
economy staggering under sanctions and rocked by falling oil prices,
what will Iran and the Quds Force do when they have a cash infusion of
more than 20 percent of their GDP -- the equivalent of an infusion of
$3.4 trillion into our economy?
“If Iran can violate its obligations for more than a decade, it can't
then be allowed to avail themselves of the same provisions and
protections they violated in the first place. We have to ask: Why
would our negotiators decide to negotiate access to other IAEA
documents, but not these documents? Maybe the reason, as some members
of Congress and public reports have raised, is because it will be the
Iranians and not the IAEA performing the tests and providing the samples
to be analyzed, which would be the equivalent of having an athlete
accused of using performance enhancing drugs submit an unsupervised
urine sample to the appropriate authority. Chain of custody doesn't
matter when the evidence given to you is prepared by the perpetrator.
“For me, the administration's willingness to forgo a critical element of
Iran's weaponization -- past and present -- is inexplicable. Our
willingness to accept this process on Parchin is only exacerbated by the
inability to obtain anytime, anywhere inspections, which the
Administration always held out as one of those essential elements we
would insist on and could rely on in any deal. Instead, we have a
dispute resolution mechanism that shifts the burden of proof to the U.S.
and its partners, to provide sensitive intelligence, possibly revealing
our sources and the methods by which we collected the information and
allow the Iranians to delay access for nearly a month, a delay that
would allow them to remove evidence of a violation, particularly when it
comes to centrifuge research-and-development, and weaponization efforts
that can be easily hidden and would leave little or no signatures.
“Mark Dubowitz, the widely-respected sanctions expert from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has said:
‘For Secretary Kerry to claim we have
absolute knowledge of Iran's weaponization activities is to assume a
level of U.S. intelligence capability that defies historical experience.
That's why he, President Obama, Undersecretary Sherman and IAEA chief
Amano all have made PMD resolution such an essential condition of any
nuclear deal.’
“He goes on to say:
‘The U.S. track record in detecting and
stopping countries from going nuclear should make Kerry more modest in
his claims and assumptions. The U.S. missed the Soviet Union, China,
India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Washington underestimated
Saddam's program in 1990. Then it overestimated his program in 2003 and
went to war to stop a nonexistent WMD program.’
“It is precisely because of this track
record that permitting Iran to have the size and scope of an
industrialized nuclear program, permitted under the JCPOA is one of the
great flaws of the agreement.
“Whether or not the supporters of the
agreement admit it, this deal is based on ‘hope’-- hope that when the
nuclear sunset clause expires Iran will have succumbed to the benefits
of commerce and global integration. Hope that the hardliners will have
lost their power and the revolution will end its hegemonic goals. And
hope that the regime will allow the Iranian people to decide their fate.
“Hope is part of human nature, but unfortunately it is not a national security strategy.
“The Iranian regime, led by the
Ayatollah, wants above all to preserve the regime and its Revolution,
unlike the Green Revolution of 2009. So it stretches incredulity to
believe they signed on to a deal that would in any way weaken the regime
or threaten the goals of the Revolution.
THC doesn't know whether Senator Menendez'scurrent legal problems will
land him in jail but thanks him for his thoughtful statement. He certainly hopes that if the Senator does end up in the clink by that time
we will have gender-neutral prisons where Secretary Clinton can join him.
(Future cellmates?)
And finally this is Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ), perhaps best known for videos with Governor Chris Christie,announcing his support for the agreement on the grounds that the Administration has so hopelessly compromised the sanctions regime we have no alternative but to go ahead with the agreement:
Despite its significant shortcomings, we have passed a point of no return.
We began negotiations with Iran
at a time when our sanctions regime was having its most significant
impact on the Iranians. We were gaining maximum leverage on Iran through
coordinated economic sanctions with our international partners. We
joined with our partner nations at the outset of negotiations with the
stated intention of preventing Iran from having the capability to get a
nuclear weapon.
Unfortunately,
it’s clear we didn’t achieve that objective and have only delayed — not
blocked — Iran’s potential nuclear breakout.
But,
with the JCPOA, we have now passed a point of no return that we should
have never reached, leaving our nation to choose between two imperfect,
dangerous and uncertain options. Left with these two choices, I
nonetheless believe it is better to support a deeply flawed deal, for
the alternative is worse. Thus, I will vote in support of the deal. But
the United States must recognize that to make this deal work, we must be
more vigilant than ever in fighting Iranian aggression.
But this deal has clear flaws and substantial risks even beyond the
obvious and disturbing short duration of its term. With this deal, we
are legitimizing a vast and expanding nuclear program in Iran. We are in
effect rewarding years of their deception, deceit, and wanton disregard
for international law by allowing them to potentially have a domestic
nuclear enrichment program at levels beyond what is necessary for a
peaceful civil nuclear program.
Even under sanctions and with a
crippled economy, Iran had the means with which to fund and arm its
destabilizing proxies in the region, support terrorism against Israel,
and fund the murderous regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Now, with the deal,
the Iranian economy stands to grow five percent annually, creating a
potentially more reliable and steady pipeline of funding and resources
for destabilizing activities and terrorism. Easing sanctions will
further put our allies at risk and demand a far greater level of
engagement and investment in the security of the region, particularly
our critical ally Israel.
Finally, this deal includes the termination of the United Nations
embargo on Iran’s conventional arms and ballistic missile technology
after five and eight years, respectively. Even with increased vigilance
by the United States and our allies, this will bolster Iran’s
conventional weapons threats in the region.
If we don’t approve the deal, we risk our sanctions being quickly and
thoroughly weakened when other nations and companies worldwide stop
cooperating. Future prospects of tightening and enforcing sanctions will
dim.
They came about through diplomacy and negotiation with other members of
the P5+1 with the intention of bringing about a specific end. Our
partners in the P5+1 believe we have accomplished that end and will not
consent to maintaining the sanctions regime this deal modifies.
Regardless of our path forward, we are faced with an Iran on the verge
of breakout to a nuclear bomb at some point in the next 15 years. If we
proceed with the deal, that point likely occurs about 15 years from now,
albeit with the added serious concern that the international community
has legitimized a significant portion of the path Iran would take to a
nuclear weapon.
And with that ringing endorsement we'll bring this post to a close and hope for the best - though as Senator Menendez reminds us that is not a good basis for America's national security policy.
We all remember President Obama's massive miscalculation when he flippantly dismissed ISIS in 2014 as "the JV (junior varsity) team". Watch this video in which CNN's Wolf Blitzer of all people schools National Security Advisor Susan Rice on the Iran deal, specifically about the enhanced ability of the "Death to America, Death to Israel" mullahs to fund terrorist organizations with the unfreezing of up to $150 billion in financial assets.
As you evaluate the worth of the Iran deal keep in mind the President's other huge miscalculations in the Mideast apart from ISIS:
Announcing in 2012 that Iraq was now a stable, secure democracy.
Helping to create amini-Iraq terrorist haven for ISIS and Al Qaeda with the overthrow of the regime in Libya.
Backing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in its failed attempt to create a radical regime.
Calling Yemen "a model for counterinsurgency" just before the collapse of the government we supported and the emergence of competing Al Qaeda and Iranian backed Shiite factions triggering Saudi participation in the conflict.
Carelessly and publicly drawing a "red line" regarding chemical weapons use by the Assad regime in Syria and then doing nothing when that line was crossed. And let's not forget his statement from May of this year regarding the use of chlorine by the Syrian regime that "chlorine was not historically a chemical weapon" which would come as a surprise to the thousands who died from exposure to chlorine in World War One and its inclusion as a banned chemical weapon (perhaps he didn't take that course in college, instead electing to hear from Edward Said about how the West was at fault for everything in the Middle East).
Telling us in 2012 that Tayyip Erdogan, the Islamist President of Turkey, was one of the five world leaders with whom he maintains a close personal relationship. This is the same President who had already stated "democracy was like a bus ride, once he gets to his stop he will get off"; now backs ISIS against the Kurds and stokes rising anti-Semitism in his country where his party's TV channel recently broadcast a sequel to The Protocols of the Elder Zion.
And let's not even get started on the Israeli-Palestinian thing.
(The Ayatollah of Rock n Rolla (obligatory 
(From Khamenei's twitter feed (yes, he is active on twitter), showing Barack Obama with a gun to his head; according to the President this is not "chickenshit")
(Nilufar (now Masoumeh) Ebtekar)
(Barry (now Barack) Obama) 
(Arak heavy water plant)
