On this date in 1914, the British light cruiser HMS Birmingham rammed and sunk the U-15, the first German submarine to be lost in World War One. The armies of the continent were mobilizing, about to plunge Europe into the disaster that set the course for the rest of the century.
Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary (AH), and his wife Sophie, in Sarajevo on June 28, by the teenage Slav nationalist Gavrilo Princip, the Austrians delivered an ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, and then declared war on the Serbs five days later. Serbia's ally Russia, began mobilizing its military against AH on July 31. In response, AH's ally Germany, declared war on Russia the following day and then on Belgium and Russia's ally France on August 3. The following day, the United Kingdom made its declaration against Germany. Two days later AH went to war against Russia, and Serbia issued its declaration against Germany.
As with the American Civil War, none of the parties, to quote Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address, "expected for the war the magnitude or the duration", while "Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding".
In preparation for a visit to Western Front battlefields next month, I've been doing some reading. While some has focused on the military aspects like The First World War by Hew Strachan and The Western Front by Nick Lloyd, I've also been delving into the origins of the war. A few years ago I read Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. Over the last month I read July Crisis by TG Otte and listened to a series on podcasts on The Rest Is History, the outstanding podcast by British historians Tom Holland and Dominic Sandbrook, on the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the failed diplomatic efforts of the following five weeks that gave the world its war.
The period from the morning of June 28 to July 31 leaves one with the same feeling as watching a "by the numbers" horror movie where find yourself thinking "don't open that door!", "don't go in that room!!", and "splitting up is a really bad strategy!!!", yet the characters proceed to go ahead, nonetheless.
What is striking is how much the actions of the major actors in those weeks, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany was driven by fear, not expansionism or militarism. Austria-Hungary saw itself as a weakening power, threatened by the demands of multiple nationalities within the empire, and particularly by its Slav population incited, as they saw it, by the Serbs. Without action to finally end the Serb threat, the Hapsburg faced a dire future, a view shared by a Germany, increasingly concerned about its main ally's slow decline. The Russians felt humiliated by recent diplomatic setbacks and worried about the lose of reputation and status if it failed to respond in defense of its ally Serbia. The Germans feared the rapid growth of the Russian economy and its military strength which might surpass theirs within a decade, as well as the growing strength of France, leading to threats on two fronts. As for the French, they mostly played an inciting role in this period, encouraging strong action by their Russian ally, while seeing an opportunity to liberate Alsace-Lorraine.
Though AH was seeking to militarily punish Serbia, none of the countries sought a general European war, yet they achieved that result, due to miscalculation, negligence and inattentiveness early in the crisis, and the irresponsibility of diplomats in AH, Russia, Germany, and France, along with the disengagement of Britain for much of July.
The Serbian government did not plan, nor desire the assassination, and made some ineffective efforts to stop the team of assassins once learning something was afoot. But it was organized by Serbs of the secretive Black Hand organization, led by Dragutin Dimitrijevic, known more widely by his alias of Apis, who was also chief of Serbian Military Intelligence. Through intermediaries a group of young and reckless Slav idealists, including the Bosnian Serb Princip, were easily manipulated into carrying out the attack on the Archduke.
Franz Ferdinand was selected as a target because as heir to the ailing 83 year old monarch Franz Joseph, he was seen as the leading AH proponent for war against Serbia, and was also advocating for a larger role for Slavs within the empire as a counterbalance to the Hungarians, a policy which, if successful, would undermine Serbian goals of establishing a larger Slav state to be run by Serbs. On the latter issue, the Serbs made the correct assessment, but on the former, not only was Franz Ferdinand not an advocate of war against Serbia, he was the leading figure opposing a war on that nation.
On the morning of June 28 it took a series of individual decisions by officials and a lack of communication to bring about that moment when, by chance, after the driver took a wrong turn, the car carrying Franz Ferdinand and his wife stopped directly in front of the dejected Princip, who had seen one of his fellow plotters toss a bomb at the car earlier with little impact, and believed their attempt had failed completely. Princip took advantage, acted quickly, firing two shots, and killing Ferdinand and Sophie. If any one of those decisions or actions had gone differently Princip would never have had the opportunity.
In the aftermath most AH political and military figures saw an opportunity to attack and dismantle Serbia and designed an ultimatum they knew would be unacceptable to the Serb government. Heedless of the larger implications of its plans it plunged ahead. Astonishingly it was not until just before issuing its ultimatum, premised on a fast followup attack on Serbia, that the civilian government was informed by its military that it would not be prepared to attack until mid-August! Nor did anyone give any much thought to what would happen if Russia intervened. To the extent Russia was considered the Austrians figured that since they had been diplomatically humiliated when AH annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 and in Balkan War maneuvering it would react the same in 1914. But Russia, looking at those same two events when it backed down, was determined not have it happen again.
While efforts were made in Germany, Russia, and near the end of July by Britain, to prevent a wider war, they proved at cross-purposes and ineffectual. Perhaps if Europe still had statesman with the skill and vision of Metternich, Bismarck, and Disraeli, there would have been a faster and more effective attempt to find a solution short of war but statesmen were in short supply in July 1914.
What followed cost more than ten million lives, ended the monarchies in Russia, AH, Germany, completed the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, gave birth to fascism and communism, and planted the seeds for the next European war.
Austria-Hungary, the country most responsible for the war, proved inept militarily, setting the stage for its self-destruction. In a giant humiliation for the empire, its first three attempted invasions of the small nation of Serbia were easily repulsed. It was only with the help of Bulgaria and Germany that it finally succeeded in late 1915. Indeed, Austria's only military successes in the war occurred with German help and under its direction; the offensive against Russia in 1915, the attack on Romania in 1916, and the offensive against Italy in 1917.
As for Serbia, whose unstable and faction ridden political scene lit the fire leading to the war, a quarter of its population died. Though Serbia emerged from the war as the leading power in the new Yugoslavia, it was also unstable and violence prone. In 1934, the Yugoslav king was murdered by Croatian nationalists. In World War Two, the Germans occupied Yugoslavia, triggering a partisan war of resistance in which 10% of the population died and a fascist Croatian puppet state killed somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 Serbs. After the war, under the rule of the Communist Tito, a unified Yugoslavia existed for four decades, but after his death the nation fell apart, going through a series of bloody civil wars, finally splitting into six different nations. No one dreams anymore of a greater Slav nation.
Gavrilo Princip was immediately captured after the assassination, admitted his guilt but, at 19, was too young to be executed under the law of Austria-Hungary. Sentenced to life imprisonment he died from tuberculosis on April 28, 1918, six months before the end of the war.
In 1917, the Serbian government-in-exile convicted the inveterate plotter Apis in a conspiracy to assassinate Prince Regent Alexander. Apis, the individual most responsible for the war, was executed in June of that year.
There is a school of history which believes the World War was inevitable, given the military buildup in the early 20th century, and the rivalry of the Great Powers. I'm not an adherent of that school of thought because I lived through the Cold War. Growing up in that period, it was difficult to see a peaceful ending, yet the Cold War ended unexpectedly and peacefully. People and contingency play a large part in how events turn out.
In the case of pre-war Europe, the great naval buildup by Germany which caused tension with Britain had ceased. In 1912, France extended its term of military service from two to three years which allowed it to significantly increase its army, leading Germany to divert funds from its navy to army. The result was an easing of tension between Germany and Britain and the beginnings of productive discussion between the two countries. Sir Edward Grey, Britain's secretary of state, was a firm advocate of better relations and meetings between foreign ministers of the two countries might have occurred later in 1914, if war had not intervened. Improved relations between the two great powers would have lessened the chances of war.
Without a war, Franz Ferdinand would have become emperor when his uncle died in 1916. Could he have succeeded in his plan to grant autonomy to a Slav entity within the empire? If so, could that have eased tensions?
Without a war could Russia, the fastest growing economy in Europe, continue its rapid industrial expansion? Could it deal with its rising class tensions and could the Romanovs have transformed into a more constitutional monarchy? Well, perhaps that last one is a bit much as it would have required brains. Without a war, does Lenin (the horrible, but indispensable man) ever return to Russia?
It was Italy's participation in the war, and the disappointment with its share of the spoils afterwards, that emboldened Mussolini and led to the rise of fascism. Without a war in 1914, does fascism still emerge?
And then, we have Germany without a losing war. Enough said.
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