Wednesday, June 18, 2025

Downfall: The End Of The War With Japan

This is a revised version of a post I published on this date ten years ago.

On June 18, 1945, at a White House meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of War and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy, President Harry Truman approved plans for the invasion of Japan.  Along with the President the other key participants were General George C Marshall and Admiral Ernest King, Chiefs of Staff for the Army and Navy.

http://www.defense.gov/specials/secdef_histories/secdefimg/georgemarshall.jpghttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e5/FADM_Ernest_J._King.jpg

Richard B. Frank's 1999 book, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, using information that had only become available in the prior decade recasts our understanding of the events of the last few months of WWII and the endgame with Japan, culminating in its surrender on August 14, 1945 (the formal ceremony took place on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2).  These sources include Russian archives which became available after the fall of the Soviet Union; the release, after Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989, of his lengthy account (dictated in early 1946) of those months; the completion of the Japanese War History Series and the release of additional American intelligence information, most importantly, of the Magic Diplomatic Summaries.  The Magic materials were a daily summary of intercepted Japanese diplomatic cables produced by U.S. intelligence analysts.  These summaries, distributed to senior American policy makers, provide us with a new window on the information they were receiving about Japanese intentions and the contemporaneous interpretations placed on that information.

In recent decades the end of the war has focused on the American decision to use the newly developed atomic bombs, but Frank's book covers much broader ground, opening our eyes to a vision of a surprising counterfactual history in which the U.S. may not have invaded Japan, even if the bombs had not been dropped and the war had continued beyond mid-August 1945.

What were Truman and the others thinking about as they entered the meeting room on June 18?

The night before, Truman had written in his diary that the decision whether to "invade Japan [or] bomb and blockade" would be his "hardest decision to date".

The men entering the meeting knew the American public was increasingly war-weary and shocked by the enormous casualties of the past year.  In the first 30 months of WWII, the U.S. suffered 91,000 battle deaths, an average of about 3,000 a month.  With the D-Day landings in France and the American assault on Saipan in the Pacific in June 1944, the toll accelerated.  During the next twelve months, 196,000 Americans died in combat, an average of more than 16,000 a month (1).  With the end of the European war in May, public pressure to start bringing the troops home was increasing, though a poll that month found the U.S. public still preferring unconditional surrender to a negotiated end to the war by a margin of 9 to 1.

In early 1945 the Pacific war grew even more horrendous as we approached Japan.  On the 8-square miles of Iwo Jima over five weeks in February and March 1945, 7,000 Americans died and 17,000 were wounded fighting 21,000 Japanese soldiers; the desperate nature of the fighting captured in the words of General Graves Erskine at the dedication of the 3rd Marine Division Cemetery on Iwo:

"Victory was never in doubt . .  . What was in doubt, in all our minds, was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would die knocking out the last Japanese gun and gunner."
Iwo was followed on April 1 by the American landing on Okinawa.  In the next ten weeks another 50,000 American soldiers and sailors were killed or wounded in the course of eliminating a Japanese garrison of 92,000 in a struggle that came to resemble the trench warfare of WWI, the grinding and unrelenting nature of which had also resulted in thousands of additional psychiatric casualties.For a better idea of what the awful fighting conditions read With The Old Breed: From Peleliu To Okinawa, Marine veteran E.B. Sledge's unforgettable account of combat on the hillsides under continuous shelling amidst the mud and broken bodies. Along with these campaigns significant fighting continued in the Philippines, at sea, and in smaller operations on islands across the Pacific as well as by our British, Australian and New Zealand allies engaged across the Pacific and in Burma.

Along with the weariness, the increasing toll from these battles enraged American civilians and soldiers.  Many accounts by American soldiers bitterly reflect on the senselessness of what the Japanese army was doing - they had clearly lost the war by this point - why sacrifice themselves and cause more Americans to die in the process?  There had been great anger against Japan since the start of the war, triggered by the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, and amplified by increasing reports of atrocities against American prisoners (according to polling data public anger against the Germans was less until the discovery of the Nazi death camps at the end of the war).  Now it was being ratcheted up even further as thousands of Americans died needlessly because the Japanese could not recognize they had lost the war, inducing a high degree of fatalism among the U.S. soldiers who were told that summer they would be part of the invasion force.

Those meeting on June 18 knew the Allied policy was unconditional surrender for Japan as set by FDR and Churchill at the Casablanca Conference in 1943.

They knew that the Magic Summaries showed no Japanese government disposition for peace on these terms, and that the military members who dominated the cabinet still hoped that enough casualties could be inflicted upon the invading Americans so a peace, more favorable to Japan, could be negotiated.

They knew that Japan still had 2 million military personnel stationed outside Japan, scattered across Pacific islands, New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies, China, Korea, Burma and Indochina and they wanted to force a formal surrender by the Japanese government to avoid years of piecemeal fighting with each of these isolated forces.

At the June 18 meeting the broad strategy for the invasion of Japan was set out, and approval given to initiate formal planning for the invasions.  The first landings would be on the island of Kyushu, the southernmost of the four main Japanese homeland islands, on November 1.  Kyushu's seizure was required so that the Air Force could build the airfields needed for the fighter aircraft to provide air cover for the climactic landing on the Honshu plain near Tokyo planned for March 1, 1946. 

Truman was told the military planners assumed that about 760,000 American troops would face 350,000 Japanese on Kyushu supported by about 2500-3000 aircraft.  Although the Joint Chiefs unanimously supported this decision, the President was not told that the Navy, unlike the Army, did not believe an invasion would ultimately be needed and that in Admiral King was only supporting preparations for the landing on Kyushu.  King believed a blockade and aerial bombing would bring about surrender.  His Pacific commander, Admiral Nimitz, had recently told King he had changed his mind about supporting the invasion "after further experience in fighting against Japanese forces".

Six weeks later, American intelligence had assembled a completely different picture of what awaited on Kyushu.  The Japanese Army had figured out that the American landing would be on the island and bet everything on a strategy of inflicting maximum casualties in order to achieve a negotiated settlement to the war, involving preservation of the Emperor, no Allied occupation of Japan, and retaining at least some portions of Japan's overseas empire. What had changed in those few weeks?

  • Instead of 350,000 troops, American intelligence now estimated there would be 650,000 (it was discovered after the end of the war that the Japanese had actually packed 900,000 troops onto the island), and the Japanese had identified the specific American landing beaches.

  • Instead of 2500-3000 aircraft, the Japanese had between 6,000 and 10,000 and were going to employ many of them in waves of kamikaze attacks against vulnerable transport ships packed with thousands of American troops (the Okinawa kamikaze attacks, which cost the lives of 5,000 Americans, had been on warships)
  • The entire civilian population of the island had been mobilized, armed (in some cases just with hoes and spades) and trained to attack the American soldiers when they came ashore, creating a situation where the U.S. military would be unable to distinguish between soldiers and civilians, resulting in enormous casualties on both sides.
  • The Japanese military had issued orders to kill all Allied prisoners of war once the American invasion started.
During these weeks the Magic Diplomatic Summaries indicated no improvement in the prospects of a peace offer from Japan on Allied terms.  An enormous literature on this topic has been created over the past half-century.  For a time in the 1960s and 1970s, revisionist historians held the high ground with claims that Truman and company ignored Japanese peace overtures because of concerns about the rising power of the Soviet Union, leading to the use of the bomb as an intimidation move against the Russians.  As more documents and information have become available, along with revelations of how some revisionist historians distorted and cherry-picked existing data, the tide of revisionism has receded.  Without rehashing the entire saga, suffice it to say that Japan's foreign minister admitted after the war that the Cabinet never agreed on a specific route for terminating the war, and the Magic intercepts revealed a series of communications between the government at home and its ambassadors that were confusing in many respects but always clear in one: unconditional surrender was unacceptable and future events (i.e, casualties inflicted on Americans during the anticipated invasion) might lead to termination of the war on more favorable terms. For those interested in knowing more about the rise and fall of revisionism read this scholarly paper.

According to Franks, the new intelligence would have led Admiral King to withdraw his support for the Kyushu landing, precipitating a new strategic review by President Truman in the second half of August, particularly in light of the President's concern over American casualties, if the war had not ended on August 14 after the bombing of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on August 8.

At the same time, the Air Force had come up with a new approach to strategic bombing that it planned to implement in September 1945.  Unlike the massive incendiary attacks which burned down large parts of Japan's biggest cities between March and June, the new campaign focused on a small number of key rail yards, bridges, tunnels and ferries.  The Air Force had finally realized that with Japan's poor, and mostly unpaved, road network, the distribution of food supplies could be paralyzed by disrupting fewer than 100 rail and shipping locations.  With Japan's population already on the brink of starvation, the effect of this campaign would have been catastrophic.  It was already so bad that, even with the war ending in August, as late as March 1946 the average daily ration for Tokyo civilians, nominally only 1,042 calories was, in reality, closer to 800 calories, and starvation only avoided by massive U.S. food supplies.

This strategic review would have provoked intense controversy within the Administration since the U.S. Army was still committed to the invasion strategy.  There is no indication that Truman ever knew of the new intelligence on the Japanese military buildup on Kyushu or of the new Air Force bombing plan, and with the end of the war it was not necessary to raise the issue to the Presidential level.

All of this creates a hypothetical future where no American invasion of Japan occurs even if the war went on beyond mid-August.  The likely results:
  • Continued American blockade of the Japan home islands and complete disruption of the food supply by the Air Force bombing campaign inducing famine in the civilian population.
  • The invasion of lightly defended Hokkaido (the northernmost home island of Japan) by the Soviets in September 1945 - one of the revelations from the opening of the Soviet archives in the 1990s.
  • The British proceeding with their planned amphibious landing in Malaya, scheduled for early September, and incurring heavy casualties against Japanese forces who had anticipated the landings.
  • Continued fighting in the Philippines, on smaller islands across the Pacific, and in China.
  • Huge death tolls of Asian civilians under Japanese occupation (primarily in China and secondarily in Southeast Asia), estimated to be 100,000 to 250,000 a month from famine, disease, imprisonment and execution.

The question is how long could Japan have survived in this scenario and whether the ending would be an organized surrender of all Japanese military forces or a disorganized collapse in which scattered fighting continued across the Pacific and mainland Asia. The end of the Pacific war, just as that of the European war, would have been grim under any scenario.  

This post only begins to touch on the issues impacting the end of the war and covered in detail in Downfall.  Frank discusses the Soviet attack on Japan in Manchuria and its impact on the Japanese government, the lead up to, and the impact of, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, Japanese cabinet deliberations and debates over peace terms, the controversy over American casualty estimates for the invasion (for an excellent summary of the complex history and methodology of the casualty estimates read "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas" by DM Giangreco in Hiroshima In History, edited by Robert James Maddox (2007)) and the nuts and bolts of U.S. and Japanese military operational planning.

The book is thought provoking, giving the reader a greater appreciation of the information decision makers had available, the different paths that could have been followed and the consequences that would have flowed from them.  It is particularly valuable in conveying what it is like to have to make decisions affecting the lives of millions with only the information you have available at the time and without the advantage of hindsight.

It strikes THC that these events would be a terrific instructional tool for students and others regarding real-life contingencies and decision-making.  A course where students were assigned roles in the American civilian and military hierarchy and then fed information as it became available and asked to make decisions based on the available information would make for a memorable learning experience, and would probably be humbling and sobering to those who think everything looks as clear to the participants at the time as it does to others in hindsight.  It could be done in two parts - the first based upon what we know happened through the decisions to drop the atomic bombs and accept the continued role of Emperor Hirohito and a second based on a scenario where the bombs are not dropped and the war continues.  Most importantly, those participating should be challenged along the way by the instructor(s) but not led to any predetermined outcome.

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(1)  196,000 is double the total number of American combat fatalities in the 80 years since 1945 including Korea, Vietnam, The Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Tuesday, June 17, 2025

Iran Refresher

Ten years ago I wrote four posts about the Iran Nuclear Deal.  Thought I'd relink to them given current events.

The Iran Deal: It Was Never About Nuclear Weapons in which I analyze the negotiations, the actual contents of the JCPOA (yes, I read the whole thing), and the underlying agenda of the Obama administration.  It also includes the conclusions of a number of prominent Democrats.

He's At It Again about the rhetoric employed by the president in support of the agreement.

Let's Not Forget About the Iran Nuclear Deal discussing progressive Democrat Rep. Ted Lieu's analysis of why the JCPOA was a bad deal.

What Is The Iran Deal?  Turns out it was not a treaty, nor an executive agreement, a signed document, or legally binding.  It was, in John Kerry's words, simply a political commitment.

For an assessment of the current situation, today's Tablet Magazine carries an interview with a former IAEA inspector regarding Iran's nuclear facilities, Can Israel End Iran's Nuclear Program?   Having reached this point, the only way out is to do so by whatever means necessary (though I want Israel to do this without direct American involvement).

I'll also link to a piece I wrote in January 2020, Reflections On The Middle East Wars, which includes some additional comments on Iran.  Since writing it, I've done additional research which would lead me to add material to the Iraq section, though I knew the basics at the time and should have made the point more clearly.  If I were doing that post today I would emphasize in addition to the intelligence failures, the absolute disaster of the Bush administration when it came to post-war planning and defining goals.  I was not impressed with George W Bush during the 2000 campaign but felt reassured on the foreign policy side with Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Powell leading the team.  I viewed them as sober, experienced politicians.  What a mistake!  Cheney went nuts, Rumsfeld was irresponsible, and Powell employed passive-aggressive behavior throughout.  They were never in agreement about the decision to attack Iraq or what to do afterwards while National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice failed miserably in what should have been her role in reconciling those views and coming to some time of agreement.  And the ultimate responsibility was President Bush's in going to war with no clear sense of goals or plan for the aftermath, other than fantasies about Iraq's future.  The failures of the foreign policy establishments of both parties after the ending of the Cold War is a cautionary tale and one of the reasons Trump ended up as president.

Monday, June 16, 2025

Raffy's Last Game

 


And now Rafael Devers is gone from the Red Sox.  Pictured are my two Devers bobbleheads.  His last game with the Sox was on Sunday against the Yankees in which Raffy homered in the 5th and drew a walk in his next, and last, at bat in the 8th.

After a miserable start to the season, going 0-21 with 15 strikeouts, Raffy had been the best hitter on the team, averaging .296, slugging .538, with an on-base percentage of .413.

The return haul from the Giants in the trade is not impressive.  Nor was the return from the Dodgers in 2018 in the Mookie Betts trade.  There are some differences in the circumstances.  Mookie had an expiring contract and a was much better all-round player.  Devers is in the 3rd season of a ten-year contract, defensively challenged, and playing solely as a DH.  In addition, he and management clearly did not see eye to eye.  Still disappointing as the Sox had just swept the Yanks, won 7 of 8, and were above .500 for the first time in over a month.  Guess management needed to find something to break the momentum.

Saturday, June 14, 2025

Solly's Last Game

On this date in 1959, 36 year old Solly Hemus entered the game in the 8th inning as a pinch-hitter for shortstop Alex Grammas.  The St Louis Cardinals, playing at home, entered the 8th down 3-1 to the Cincinnati Reds.  With two out, George Crowe doubled home Ken Boyer, reducing the Reds' margin to one, and Solly came to the plate with Crowe on second and a chance to even the score.  Instead, he hit a weak grounder to shortstop Eddie Kasko who made the easy throw to first, ending the inning.  It was Solly's last appearance as a player in a major league game.

 

My first memory of collecting baseball cards was of the most frequent cards being those of Phillies shortstop Granny Hamner and Solly Hemus of the Cards, so this must have been 1959, or possibly 1958 (when Hemus was also with the Phillies).  It was always a disappointment getting Granny or Solly because I wanted the big sluggers and top pitchers who were rarities in the card sets we purchased, although a stick of gum came with each pack!

Solomon Joseph Hemus was a shortstop, second baseman, and pinch hitter, who came up to the Cards in 1949, after spending four years during WW2 as an ordnance loader on aircraft carriers, playing with the Birds until traded to the Phillies during the 1956 season and returning to St Louis before the 1959 season. 

Born in Phoenix in 1923, Solly's SABR biography starts with this description:

Pepper pot. Bulldog. Firebrand. Scrapper. Solly Hemus answered to all those descriptions in 11 years as a major-league player and 2½ as a manager.

It goes on to quote Cards GM Bing Devine, “Solly was a hell-bent-for-leather, fiery ballplayer with limited talent.”   

Hemus was considered a weak defensive infielder.  That description is consistent across the board from the observers reported in the SABR biography. However, it raises an interesting question about the newer baseball metrics, because from 1951 through 1953, Hemus is rated by Baseball-Reference as the fourth, first, and sixth rated defensive player in the National League according to Wins Above Replacement (WAR).  Defensive performance is notoriously difficult to quantify and I think it more likely this is a problem with WAR than with contemporary observers.

Solly is also rated by WAR as a top ten offensive player in 1952 and 1953, even though his conventional stats (HR/RBI/Avg) don't look too impressive (15/52/.268 and 14/61/.279).  However, he drew a lot of walks, something no one was paying a lot of attention to at the time, finishing 4th and 5th in the league, making him 6th and 3rd in on-base percentage (another stat no one used at the time).  His effectiveness as a hitter also explains his extended career as a pinch hitter after he stopped being a regular after the '53 season.

According to the SABR biography, Solly was also a racist, something that became apparent in his 2 1/2 tenure as Cardinals manager which began with the 1959 season.  The Cards were one of the last National League teams to integrate and two young black players, Curt Flood and Bob Gibson, began their careers under Hemus.  Both grew to despise their manager for his remarks and treatment; Gibson about to quit baseball because of it until coach Harry Walker persuaded him to stay. Years later Hemus apologized to both players but the damage had been done.  The SABR bio concludes with this:

Late in his life he told author David Halberstam that he had grown up and started in baseball in an era when ethnic insults were common, and had failed to keep up with changing times. He always thought of himself as the underdog: “If you can’t hit, you can’t run, and you can’t throw, you’ve got to holler at them.”

Hemus prospered in his post-baseball career and lived until he was 94, passing in 2017.

Wednesday, June 11, 2025

Surf's Up

The first albums I owned were by The Beach Boys.  This song from 1963 got me interested in the group,  a knock off of Chuck Berry's Sweet Little Sixteen with a surf sound and new lyrics.  California seemed so exotic to a kid in Connecticut.

Four years later they were recording this.  It was all Brian Wilson. 

Visiting Wickenburg

Wickenburg, about 60 miles northwest of downtown Phoenix, is the oldest town in Arizona north of Tucson, being founded in the early 1860s, beating Phoenix by about five years.  It owed its founding and initial growth to the discovery of gold and the presence of the Hassayampa River.

It had continued prosperity in the first part of the 20th century due to its location on the road from Phoenix to both Prescott and Los Angeles, losing that advantage in the 1970s, when I-10 from Phoenix to LA was located to the south and I-17 provided a faster route to Prescott, while avoiding Wickenburg.

Today we visited the Desert Caballeros Western Museum in the town, which proved to be a little gem of a museum.  The Caballeros museum is in the small downtown area and there are several restaurants within a block.  On its ground level floor the museum features interesting western art and exhibits on the history of Wickenburg, but it is when you descend into the basement that you find the real treasure - recreated stores and houses of 1912 Wickenburg along with well-done and fascinating dioramas of different aspects of the town and region's history.  A great way to spend an hour and a half, and kids would love that downstairs area, just as we did.